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I. INTRODUCTION
New Jersey has some of the United States’ strongest consumer
protection laws.1 One of the most lauded by consumer advocates is the
Consumer Fraud Act (CFA).2 When the CFA was enacted in 1960, it was
intended to be “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the
nation.”3 To maintain its position, the CFA has had an uninterrupted
history “of constant expansion of consumer protection.”4 One such
manifestation was another New Jersey consumer protection statute, the
New Jersey Truth-In-Consumer-Contract Warranty and Notice Act
(“TCCWNA”).5
Enacted in 1981 by the New Jersey State Legislature, the TCCWNA
was signed into law in 1982 by Governor Brendan Byrne.6 The
governor’s signing statement indicated that the TCCWNA was enacted
to help “strengthen[ ] provisions of the [CFA].” 7 The TCCWNA does
not create any new consumer rights.8 Instead, the TCCWNA has two
main goals: prevention and ensuring consumers are aware about their
existing rights. First, the TCCWNA focuses on prevention by prohibiting
businesses from using terms in their consumer contracts, warranties,
signs, and notices that include “provision[s] that violate[] any clearly
established legal right of a consumer.”9 Those “clearly established legal
right[s]” include rights established under other consumer protection
1
See Pro v. Hertz Equip. Rental Corp., No. 06-CV-3830, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100181, at *13-14 (D.N.J. Dec. 11, 2008) (“New Jersey law is one of the most protective
consumer fraud laws in the United States.”).
2
The CFA safeguards consumers by making it an unlawful practice for sellers of
merchandise or real estate to engage in “any unconscionable commercial practice, deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the knowing, concealment,
suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of [such]
merchandise or real estate[.]” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317,
319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
3
Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Huffmaster v.
Robinson, 534 A.2d 435, 437-38 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
4
Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 691 A.2d 350, 364 (N.J. 1997).
5
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
6
Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 427 (2013); The Truth About TCCWNA,
N.J. CIVIL JUST. INST. (Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.civiljusticenj.org/issues/the-truth-abouttccwna/. The New Jersey Civil Justice Institute advocates for a civil justice system that treats
all parties fairly and discourages lawsuit abuse. Id.
7
Statement from Brendan Byrne, Governor of New Jersey, on the Signing of Assembly
Bill No. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982).
8
See § 56:12-18.
9
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
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statutes, such as the CFA.10 Second, the TCCWNA focuses on promoting
consumer awareness by requiring sellers who conduct their business
inside and outside of New Jersey to clearly specify in their contracts,
signs and notices which provisions are “void, inapplicable, or
unenforceable in New Jersey.”11 This means that sellers are forbidden
from using “void where prohibited” clauses in their contracts, signs, and
notices.12
The most notable difference between the TCCWNA and New
Jersey’s CFA is that the TCCWNA provides a private right of action for
consumers and prospective consumers without having to establish an
actual injury.13 To state a claim under the CFA, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) unlawful conduct by the defendants; (2) an ascertainable loss on the
part of the plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship between the defendant’s
unlawful conduct and the [p]laintiffs’ ascertainable loss. 14 Alternatively
the TCCWNA contains no ascertainable loss requirement, which
necessitates that any type of damage suffered must be quantifiable or
measurable.15 Therefore, to succeed on a TCCWNA claim, a plaintiff
does not need to show that the inclusion of an invalid provision or a “void
where prohibited” clause in a contract, sign, or notice caused him or her
to suffer a financial loss or injury of any kind.16 This lack of an
ascertainable loss requirement lowers the bar for plaintiff’s attorneys to
bring and succeed on TCCWNA claims compared to actions filed under
the CFA.
After the TCCWNA was signed into law in 1982, it remained
dormant for many years.17 In fact, the statute was not mentioned in a
written opinion until 1997.18 The TCCWNA gained prominence in 2009
10
See id. “Clearly established legal rights” can include both those contained in New
Jersey and federal consumer protection statutes. Id.
11
Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549.
12
Kendall v. CubeSmart L.P., No. 15-6098, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *27
(D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2016).
13
See United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2009). The court held that, even though “[t]here [was] no evidence that any consumer
was dissatisfied with the. . . purchase[,] attempted to exercise and was denied the right to
rescind or was charged a fee for submitting a check or other instrument for payment that was
subsequently dishonored[,]” the consumers still had a private right to action under the
TCCWNA.
14
Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 202 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Cox v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 465 (N.J. 1994)).
15
See Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC, 872 A.2d 783, 793 (N.J. 2005).
16
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
17
The Truth About TCCWNA, supra note 6 (“[TCCWNA] lay dormant for many
years . . . .”).
18
See Alloway v. General Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264, 274 (N.J. 1997).
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when the New Jersey Appellate Division applied the statute to class
action lawsuits. That year, the Appellate Division held in United
Consumer Financial Services Co. v. Carbo that proof of ascertainable
loss was not necessary in order for a plaintiff to bring a class action under
TCCWNA.19 The plaintiff class in Carbo consisted of 16,845 consumers
who had purchased “Kirby” vacuum cleaners.20 The class members
brought a claim that the “notices of cancellation” contained in the
vacuum’s retail contract violated New Jersey’s Retail Installment Sales
Act.21 There was no evidence presented at trial that any consumer was
“dissatisfied with the Kirby purchased, attempted to exercise and was
denied the right to rescind or was charged a fee for submitting a check or
other instrument for payment that was subsequently dishonored.”22
Despite any ascertainable loss, the TCCWNA violation required United
Consumer Financial Services Company to pay all 16,845 class members
a statutory penalty of $100 each, totaling $1,684,500, plus attorneys’ fees
and court costs.23
Ultimately, the Carbo decision not only expanded the reach of the
TCCWNA, but opened the door for other plaintiffs to bring class actions.
The effects of Carbo are evident in the number of TCCWNA cases that
followed the decision. The frequency of TCCWNA cases rose from only
two to three per year to dozens being decided each year.24
However, the TCCWNA’s application to online commerce is
arguably a more significant expansion of the statute. In 2013, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey decided in Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc.
that online coupons were considered “property” under the TCCWNA.
Therefore, an online coupon’s terms and conditions could not contain a
provision that violated an established consumer right or contain a “void
where prohibited” clause.25 Shelton’s holding opened the floodgates for
e-commerce-based TCCWNA class actions with plaintiffs, many times
the same ones, preying upon unsuspecting nation-wide retailer’s online
19

United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v. Carbo, 982 A.2d 7, 30 (N.J. App. Div. 2009).
Id. at 14.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 15.
23
Id. at 24-25. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317,
319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (“[A]ny person who violates the provisions
of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00
or for actual damages . . . together with reasonable attorney’s fees and court costs”).
24
See The Truth About TCCWNA, supra note 6. The chart on the New Jersey Civil
Justice Institute’s webpage titled “TCCWNA Decisions” demonstrates the rapid increase of
TCCWNA claims after 2009.
25
Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 555 (N.J. 2013). Under the TCCWNA,
a consumer is “any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or
service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes.” Id. (emphasis added).
20
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terms and conditions.26
Plaintiffs are targeting online terms and conditions through
TCCWNA’s section 16.27 Section 16 requires a consumer contract,
26
Alan Brahamsha is the named plaintiff in three TCCWNA actions against Redbox
Automated Retail LLC, Supercell Oy, and Starbucks Corporation. Anne Bucher, Starbucks,
Redbox Class Actions Say Contracts Don’t Comply With NJ Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Sept.
17, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/345453-starbucksredbox-class-actions-say-contracts-dont-comply-nj-law/; Paul Tassin, Clash of Clans Class
Action Says Terms of Service Violates N.J. Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Nov. 15, 2016),
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/349409-clash-of-clans-class-ac
tion-says-terms-of-service-violates-n-j-law/. Aaron Rubin, Fay Rubin, and/or Fruma Rubin
are the named plaintiffs in TCCWNA lawsuits filed against Inuit Inc., Saks Direct Inc., and J
Crew Group, Inc. Paul Tassin, Intuit Class Action Claims Turbotax Violates N.J. Consumer
Laws, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/la
wsuit-news/332835-intuit-class-action-claims-turbotax-violates-n-j-consumer-laws/; Tamara
Burns, Saks Class Action Claims Website Terms Violate State Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr.
29, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334028-saks-websit
e-terms-conditions-violate-state-law-class-action-lawsuit-claims/; Christina Davis, J.Crew
Class Action Alleges Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 4, 2016), https://topcla
ssactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334462-j-crew-class-action-alleges-webiste
-terms-illegal/. Ryan Russell is the named plaintiff against Advance Auto Parts Inc., Clawfoot
Supply LLC, and Croscill Home. Paul Tassin, Advance Auto Parts Class Action Says Website
Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 16, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuitsettlements/lawsuit-news/335407-advance-auto-parts-class-action-says-website-terms-illega
l/; Tim Darragh, Those Terms and Conditions (That Noone Reads) Could Cost NJ Retailers,
NEW JERSEY REAL TIME NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016, 9:55 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/
2016/08/those_terms_and_conditions_that_nobody_reads_could.html. Darla Braden is a
plaintiff in cases against Staples and TTI Floor North America. Robert Boumis, Staples Class
Action Say Website’s Terms of Service Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (July 1, 2016), https://topc
lassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/339130-staples-class-action-says-websites
terms-of-service-illegal/; Anne Bucher, Hoover Faces Class Action Lawsuit Over “Unfair”
Terms and Conditions, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Feb. 16, 2015), https://topclassactions.com/laws
uit-settlements/lawsuit-news/328221-hoover-faces-class-action-lawsuit-over-unfair-termsconditions/. Lucia Candelario is the named plaintiff against Vita-Mix Corporation and
Whirlpool Corporation. Tamara Burns, Whirlpool Class Action Alleges Website Illegal Terms
of Use, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 23, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/l
awsuit-news/336001-whirlpool-class-action-alleges-website-illegal-terms-use/. Norris Hite
is the named plaintiff against Lush Cosmetics and The Finish Line Inc. Ashley Milano, Lush
Cosmetics Class Action Says Website’s “Terms of Use” Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Mar. 23
, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/331043-lush-cosmetic
s-class-action-says-website-terms-of-use-illegal/; Daniel Fisher, Creative Lawyers Give New
Meaning To The Term “Warranty Claim”, FORBES (June 3, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://www.fo
rbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2016/06/03/never-mind-defective-products-now-lawyers-are-sui
ng-over-the-warranty/2/#13a26d1e4f36. Bronwyn Nahas is the named plaintiff against
Hatworld Inc. and L Brands Inc. Ashley Milano, HatWorld, Poptropica Class Action
Lawsuits Filed Over Website Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 2, 2016), https://topclassactio
ns.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334194-hatworld-poptropica-class-action-lawsuits
-filed-over-website-terms/; Michael Kakuk, Victoria’s Secret Class Action Alleges Website
Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuitsettlements/lawsuit-news/333225-victorias-secret-class-action-alleges-website-terms-illegal.
27
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-
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notice, or sign to “clearly identify which provisions are void,
inapplicable, or unenforceable in New Jersey.” 28 Therefore, if a seller’s
website’s terms and conditions uses a “void where prohibited” clause and
fails to specify which provisions are void, inapplicable, or unenforceable
in New Jersey, that seller is in violation of the TCCWNA. 29
Section 16 and the lack of an ascertainable loss requirement is why
TCCWNA class actions can be financially treacherous for businesses. To
succeed in a TCCWNA claim, plaintiffs do not need to show that a “void
where prohibited clause” harmed them, only that it was present in the
contract, notice, or sign. This light burden of proof can be extremely
costly for businesses engaging in e-commerce since thousands, or even
millions, of customers or potential customers can be exposed to a
website’s terms and conditions.30
In 2016, at least a dozen cases were filed, which claimed that website
terms and conditions violated the TCCWNA, including suits against
Apple, Advanced Auto Parts, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Burlington Coat
Factory, Sony, Toys ‘R’ Us, Wyndham, and Victoria’s Secret.31 As a
330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
28
Shelton, 70 A.3d at 549.
29
Id.
30
See, e.g., Defendant’s Notice of Removal at 1, Huhn v. Facebook Inc., No.
2:16cv03681 (D.N.J. filed June 22, 2016) (discussing the Plaintiffs’ proposed class consists
of over four million Facebook users in New Jersey with statutory damages for a TCCWNA
claim at $100 per person; meaning Facebook could have to pay over $400 million in punitive
damages, plus attorney’s fees for the “void where prohibited” clause in Facebook’s terms and
conditions).
31
See Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16cv02338 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016). See
Paul Tassin, Apple Class Action Alleges ID Agreement Violates N.J. Law, TOP CLASS ACTIONS
(May 3, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/334348-appleclass-action-alleges-id-agreement-violates-nj-law/; Russell v. Advance Auto Parts Inc., No.
3:16cv02685 (D.N.J. filed May 12, 2016). See Paul Tassin, Advance Auto Parts Class Action
Says Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (May 16, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/
lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/335407-advance-auto-parts-class-action-says-website-ter
ms-illegal/; Sweeney v. Bed Bath & Beyond LLC, No. 2:16-cv01927 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6,
2016). See Paul Tassin, Bed Bath and Beyond Lawsuit Shouldn’t Be Dismissed, Class Says,
TOP CLASS ACTIONS (July 13, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuitnews/339862-bed-bath-beyond-lawsuit-shouldnt-dismissed-class-says/; Martinez v. Burlingt
on Stores Inc., No. 1:16cv02064 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 13, 2016). See Tamara Burns, Burlington
Coat Factory Class Action Targets Website’s Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/333001-burlington-coat-factor
y-class-action-targets-websites-terms/; Farrell et al. v. Sony Corp. et al., No. 2:16cv04391
(D.N.J. filed July , 2016); Roldan v. Toys R US Inc., No. 2:16cv01929 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6,
2016). Anne Bucher, Torys R Us, Bed Bath and Beyond Class Actions Filed Over Website
Terms, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 11, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/l
awsuit-news/332489-toys-r-us-bed-bath-beyond-class-actions-filed-over-website-terms/.
See Luca v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., No. 2:16cv00746, (W.D. Pa. filed June 6,
2016). See Tamara Burns, Wyndham Class Action Lawsuit Claims ‘Resort Fees’ Are Illegal,
TOP CLASS ACTIONS (June 8, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-
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result, businesses engaging in e-commerce are seeking relief from
TCCWNA class actions in federal court by challenging the law on Article
III standing grounds.32
In federal courts, businesses are seeking dismissal through Article
III standing arguments based on the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, which raised the bar for standing requirements.33
Spokeo’s website listed personal information about individuals such as
how to contact them, their current marital status, and occupation.34
Robins, without alleging harm or imminent harm, claimed that Spokeo
violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) because the information
the company published about him was false.35 The complaint was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.36 Robins amended his
complaint and stated the false information Spokeo posted about him
harmed his future employment opportunities.37 The complaint was
dismissed again for failure to state an injury in fact.38
Robins appealed and asserted that he had an injury that would
qualify him for standing under Article III of the United States
Constitution.39 The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s holding
and Spokeo was granted a writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court.40 The Supreme Court held that Congress or any state legislative
body could not eliminate standing requirements by “statutorily granting
the right to sue to a plaintiff who would not otherwise have standing.” 41
news/337307-wyndham-class-action-lawsuit-claims-resort-fees-illegal/; Nahas v. L Brands,
Inc., No. 2:16cv02107 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 15, 2016). See Michael Kakuk, Victoria’s Secret
Class Action Alleges Website Terms Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 20, 2016), https://topcl
assactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/333225-victorias-secret-class-action-allege
s-website-terms-illegal/. See Guzman v. Devils Arena Entertainment, No. 2:16cv01984
(D.N.J. filed Apr. 8, 2016); Rubin v. Intuit Inc., No. 3:16cv02029 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 12, 2016).
See Paul Tassin, Intuit Class Action Claims Turbotax Violates N.J. Consumer Laws, TOP
CLASS ACTIONS (Apr. 14, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuitnews/332835-intuit-class-action-claims-turbotax-violates-n-j-consumer-laws/; Hite et al. v.
Lush Cosmetics LLC, No. 1:16cv01533 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2016). See Ashley Milano, Lush
Cosmetics Class Action Says Website’s “Terms of Use” Illegal, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Mar. 23
, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/331043-lush-cosmetic
s-class-action-says-website-terms-of-use-illegal/.
32
See, e.g., Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16-cv-01485, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145589,
at *6 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016).
33
Spokeo Inc. v. Robbin, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48 (2016).
34
Id. at 1544.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 1554.
38
Id. at 1544.
39
Spokeo Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1546.
40
Id.
41
Id.
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Ultimately, the Court opined that to achieve standing for an injury in fact,
a plaintiff needs to show that the injury caused “concrete and
particularized harm.”42 Concrete injuries are those that are real and not
abstract.43 Particularized harm can be shown if an injury affects “the
plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” 44
These new standards conflict with the TCCWNA because the statute
does not require ascertainable loss in order to bring a claim.45 For
example, the plaintiff in Hecht v. Hertz, a recent New Jersey District
Court case, alleged that the defendant violated TCCWNA because its
website’s terms and conditions did not state whether New Jersey was a
jurisdiction where certain exceptions applied.46 The court dismissed the
complaint, noting that the plaintiff “[did] not allege that he even viewed
(let alone relied upon to his detriment) either of these sections of Hertz’s
website.”47 Additionally, the court explained that the plaintiff’s
arguments only presented “bare procedural harm, divorced from any
concrete harm,” which cannot “satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of
Article III.”48 The Hertz holding has gained significant traction in federal
courts. In recent months, numerous TCCWNA claims were dismissed
for failing to meet the requirements of Spokeo.49 These dismissals may
lead to more plaintiffs filing TCCWNA claims in state court.
Besides not meeting Article III standing requirements, another
reason the TCCWNA is constitutionally deficient is because the statute
imposes an excessive burden upon interstate commerce. Recently, the
TCCWNA was challenged for the first time as a violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.50 In April 2016, a TCCWNA class action was
brought against the technology giant, Apple, for its “to the extent not
prohibited by law” clause contained in its iTunes terms and conditions.51
42

Id. at 1549.
Id. at 1548.
44
Id.
45
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
46
Hecht v. Hertz Corp., No. 2:16-cv-01485, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145589, at *4
(D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2016).
47
Id.
48
Id. at *10.
49
See Rubin v. J. Crew Group, Inc., No.16-2167, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46389, at 22
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2017); Hite v. Lush Internet Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 444, 455 (D.N.J. 2017);
Russell v. Croscill Home, LLC, No. 16cv1190, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159787, slip op. at 1
(D.N.J. Oct. 11, 2016); Candelario v. Rip Curl, Inc., No. 16cv00963, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
163019, *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016) (dismissing complaint alleging a TCCWNA violation of
website terms and conditions because the plaintiff lacked Article III standing under Spokeo).
50
Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No. 3:16cv2338, 3:14-15 (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 1, 2016).
Tassin, supra note 31.
51
Id.
43
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The potential class of New Jersey iTunes users could be in the millions.52
In response, Apple argued in a July 2016 motion-to-dismiss in Silkowski
v. Apple Inc. that “extending the TCCWNA to Internet services imposes
an excessive burden on interstate commerce,”53 violating the Dormant
Commerce Clause. As of publication, the District Court of Northern
California has not ruled on the motion.
Nevertheless, this Note argues that the TCCWNA violates the
Dormant Commerce Clause because the TCCWNA’s Section 16 fails the
Pike v. Bruce Church balancing test.54 The balancing test states: “[w]here
a statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will
be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”55 This Note asserts
that the burden placed upon sellers with a nation-wide reach is excessive
in relation to the benefit of consumers’ knowledge of their existing rights.
II. HISTORY OF THE TCCWNA AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The TCCWNA
i. The Legislative History of the TCCWNA
The legislative history of the TCCWNA is limited. It was originally
introduced to the New Jersey Senate on May 1, 1980 as Bill No. 1660.56
Assemblyman Byron Baer’s Sponsor’s Statement reads:
Far too many consumer contracts, warranties, notices and
signs contain provisions [that] clearly violate the rights of
consumers. Even though these provisions are legally invalid
or unenforceable, their very inclusion in a contract, warranty,
notice or sign deceives a consumer into thinking that they are
enforceable and for
this reason the consumer often fails to
enforce his rights.57
The Sponsor’s Statement highlights that “the proposed legislation
[TCCWNA] did not recognize any new consumer rights but merely
imposed an obligation on sellers to acknowledge clearly established
consumer rights and provided remedies for posting or inserting
52
Nina Ulloa, iTunes Has 800 Million Accounts. . . And 800 Million Credit Card
Numbers. . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Apr. 24, 2014), https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2014
04/24/itunes800m/; see also New Jersey Population, WORLD POPULATION REV., http://worldp
opulationreview.com/states/new-jersey-population/ (last visited May 10, 2018).
53
Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16cv02338 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016).
54
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24); see also Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
55
Id.
56
Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 70 A.3d 544, 552 (N.J. 2013).
57
Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980).
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provisions contrary to law.”58 These “clearly established consumer
rights” include those in the CFA and other New Jersey and federal laws.59
The Sponsor’s statement additionally demonstrates that the Legislature
hoped to prevent consumer deception and give consumers another option
to assert their rights against businesses from which they purchased
products or services.
As the bill moved through the New Jersey State Legislature, the
remedies portion of the TCCWNA was amended. The original bill
contained the phrase “civil damages” in Section 4, line 3, but the final bill
replaced that phrase with “civil penalty.” 60 The statement by the
Commerce, Industry & Professions Committee accompanying the new
version of the bill reads
Section 4, as amended by the committee, provides that a
business which violates the provisions of this bill would be
liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less
than $100 if the consumer was not injured by such a violation
and for a civil penalty
and actual damages if he was injured
by such a violation.61
It is clear from the amendment that the New Jersey State Legislature
wanted to favor consumers by including a statutory penalty in order to
deter and punish offending sellers.
After the remedies section was amended, the TCCWNA was enacted
by the New Jersey State Legislature in 1981.62 A short time later, the bill
was signed into law by Governor Byrne on January 11, 1982.63 In his
signing statement, the governor reinforced the notion that the TCCWNA
was not enacted to create any new consumer rights or seller
responsibilities, but instead to bolster the CFA rights and those
established in other laws.64
ii. The Text of the TCCWNA
TCCWNA, N.J.S.A. 56:12-15 states:
No seller . . . shall in the course of his business offer to any
58

Shelton, 70 A.3d at 552. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-15 (Westlaw through L.2017, c.
317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24). See also § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through
L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
59
§ 56:12-15.
60
See Assemb. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §
56:17-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328-330, 340 and J.R. No.
24).
61
Assem. B. 1660, 199 Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 1980).
62
Shelton, 70 A.2d. at 549.
63
Statement from Brendan Byrne, Governor of New Jersey, on the Signing of Assembly
Bill No. 1660 (Jan. 11, 1982).
64
See id. (stating that the TCCWNA’s purpose was to help “strengthen[ ] provisions of
the [CFA].”).
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consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written
consumer contract or give or display any written consumer
warranty, notice or sign . . . which includes any provision that
violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or
responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as
established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is
made or the consumer contract is 65signed or the warranty,
notice or sign is given or displayed.
In short, these sections of the statute create no new rights for consumers.
Instead, Sections 12-15 bar businesses from including terms in consumer
contracts, offers, or notices that violate “clearly established rights.” 66 A
court decides whether a clearly established right is violated by
“assess[ing] whether the CFA or another consumer protection statute or
regulation clearly prohibited the contractual provision or other practice
that is the basis for the TCCWNA claim.”67
TCCWNA’s Section 16 prohibits any provision in a consumer
contract that requires a consumer to waive his or her rights under the
Act.68 Section 16 contains a specification requirement that calls for a
seller’s contracts, notices, or signs to clearly identify “which provisions
are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New
Jersey.”69 This clause forbids blanket invalidity provisions in contracts,
notice, or signs.70 These provisions are called “savings language” and
examples of such language include: “where permitted by law,”
“maximum amount allowed by law,” or “unless prohibited by law.”71
Therefore, if a seller seeks to comply with Section 16, it needs to modify
its contracts and notices to remove blanket invalidity provisions.
Furthermore, Section 16’s specification requirement applies only
when a consumer contract, notice, or sign “is or may be used in multiple
jurisdictions.”72 If a consumer contract, notice, or sign is created only for
65

§ 56:12-15.
Id.
67
Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 69 (2017). See, e.g., Mladenov v. Wegmans
Food Mkts. Inc., 124 F. Supp. 3d 360, 380 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding that plaintiffs who failed
to state viable claims under CFA or federal food labeling regulation established no violation
of “clearly established legal right” under TCCWNA); United Consumer Fin. Servs. Co. v.
Carbo, 410 N.J. Super. 280, 305 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (applying TCCWNA based
on violation of “clearly established” right under Retail Installment Sales Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:16C-50).
68
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Kendall v. CubeSmart L.P., No. 15-6098, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *27
(D.N.J. Apr. 21, 2016).
72
Id.; see also Walters v. Dream Cars Nat’l, LLC, No. BER-L-9571-14, 2016 N.J. Super.
Unpub. LEXIS 498, at *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Mar. 7, 2016) (“[I]f a consumer contract
66
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use in New Jersey and controlled by New Jersey law, the specification
requirement in Section 16 does not apply.73 The court in Kendall stated
that it would be “redundant” to explain which provisions may or may not
be enforceable under New Jersey law, and that “when the contract, notice,
or sign is a New Jersey-specific document, the savings language ‘merely
operates as a severability clause, protecting the remainder of the contract
should some portion of it be declared void or unenforceable.’”74
In addition to clarifying Section 16’s application, the Kendall court
created three requirements that a plaintiff must meet in order state a claim
under the clause. For a Section 16 violation under the TCCWNA, a
plaintiff must allege the following:
(1) The existence of consumer contract, notice, or sign that is
or may be used in multiple jurisdictions; (2) which states,
either expressly or implicitly, that any of its provisions may
be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in some jurisdictions;
and, (3) that the consumer contract, notice or sign fails to
specify which provisions are or
are not void, unenforceable,
or inapplicable in New Jersey.75
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy all three requirements, the TCCWNA
claim under Section 16 fails.
The final sections of the TCCWNA are 17 and 18, which describe
the remedies available to consumers who had their rights violated under
the statute: “Any person, who violates the provisions of the statute shall
be liable to an aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty not less than $100,
actual damages, or both at the election of the consumer, in addition to
reasonable attorneys’ fees and court costs.”76 The remedies are plaintiff
friendly, especially for those who choose to bring a TCCWNA claim as
a class action.77 Unfortunately, for defendants, these claims can be costly,
especially in a class action with a proposed class of consumers or
potential consumers in the thousands or millions.78
is or may be used in multiple jurisdictions and expressly states that any of its provisions are
or may be void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in certain of those jurisdictions, the contract
must specify how these provisions are void, unenforceable, or inapplicable in New Jersey.”).
73
Castro v. Sovran Self Storage, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 204, 213 (D.N.J. 2015) (holding
that the defendant’s rental agreement only applied to New Jersey so there was no indication
that the provision at issue contemplated the contract’s application in multiple jurisdictions
such that its enforceability in New Jersey must be clarified).
74
Id. (quoting Castro, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 213).
75
Kendall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53668, at *28.
76
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-17 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325, 328330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
77
David F. Katz & Elizabeth K. Hinson, Plaintiffs Target Online Retailers’ Website
Terms & Conditions in Consumer Class Actions Brought under New Jersey Consumer
Protection Law, LEXOLOGY, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b68f5f68-ea8343b6-9c86-74a6f8ea83a2 (last visited May 10, 2018).
78
Alloway v. General Marine Indus., L.P., 695 A.2d 264 (N.J. 1997).
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B. The Dormant Commerce Clause
The United States Constitution’s Commerce Clause allows
Congress “to regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States.”79 The Commerce Clause both grants “regulatory power
to Congress” and “denies the States the power to unjustifiably
discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of
commerce.”80 This denial of state power or “negative” application of the
Commerce Clause is called the Dormant Commerce Clause.81 The
purpose of the Dormant Commerce Clause is to “create an area of trade
free from interference by the States,” and to prevent States from
“jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a whole” by “plac[ing] burdens
on the flow of commerce across its borders that commerce wholly within
those borders would not bear.”82
There are two theoretical justifications for the Dormant Commerce
Clause. The primary justification is grounded in economic efficiency.
The Dormant Commerce Clause safeguards free trade among the states,
which secures the associated economic benefits.83 The secondary
justification is that the clause protects out-of-state actors who are
burdened by a state’s regulation but lack a voice in the political process
of the state imposing the burden.84
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, a state statute may
discriminate against interstate commerce in two ways: facially or in its
practical effect.85 First, a state statute facially discriminates when there
is “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that benefits the former and burdens the latter. . . .”86 This form of
79

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
81
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1791 (2015) (quoting
Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)).
82
See Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. at 180.
83
See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273- 74 (1988); Daniel A. Garber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade
and the Regulatory State: A GATT’s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1401, 1406 (1994); Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism:
Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
84
See, e.g., South Carolina v. Barnwell Brothers, 303 U.S. 177, 185 n. 2 (1938); Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 n. 2 (1945); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 205-06 (1980); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant
Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 439 (1982).
85
Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 785 (4th Cir. 1996).
86
United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330,
338 (2007). See also Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. PSC, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992).
80
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discrimination will be subject to “strict scrutiny” by the courts and is
likely to be found invalid per se.87
Second, a state statute may discriminate in its practical effect even
“if a statute regulates evenhandedly and only indirectly affects interstate
commerce.”88 In this instance of discrimination, the standards for
scrutiny are less rigorous, and a court is more likely to defer to the
judgment of a state’s legislature.89
To determine whether discrimination exists, courts will apply the
balancing test established in Pike v. Bruce Church: “Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
about the putative local benefits.”90 If there is no legitimate local
purpose, the statute will not be deemed constitutional.91 Conversely, if
there is a legitimate local purpose, an acceptable degree of burden a state
places on interstate commerce will depend on “the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.”92
III. BALANCED OR UNBALANCED? WHY THE TCCWNA FAILS PIKE
This section analyzes whether the TCCWNA’s Section 16 violates
the dormant Commerce Clause by failing the Pike balancing test.93 Since
the TCCWNA regulates even-handedly, Part A explores whether the
TCCWNA serves a legitimate New Jersey state interest.94 Part B
addresses whether the burden imposed by the TCCWNA on interstate
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the nature of the benefit it
provides New Jersey. Part C examines whether New Jersey’s interests
87

See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S.
573, 579 (1986) (“When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests,
we have generally struck down the statute without further inquiry.”) (emphasis added); North
Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 919 (8th Cir. 2016).
88
Envtl. Tech. Council, 98 F.3d at 785.
89
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579. The court examined whether the
State’s interest being promoted by the statute was legitimate, rather than striking the statute
down without inquiry. Id.
90
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24); see also Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
94
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (the TCCWNA contains no language that discriminates against
out-of-state sellers).
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“could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”95
A. Consumer Protection is a Legitimate State Interest
The United States Supreme Court and other federal courts have
repeatedly asserted the importance of consumer protection.96 Court
decisions from across the United States have established that state
governments possess a legitimate interest in safeguarding its citizens
against dangerous products, fraud, deceptive advertising, and unfair
business practices that can cause harm.97 Therefore, New Jersey has a
legitimate state interest in protecting its consumers, which it may seek to
serve by enacting the TCCWNA.
The TCCWNA’s sponsor statement demonstrates that the New
Jersey Legislature hoped that, by enacting the statute, it would prevent
consumer deception and give consumers a legal course of action to assert
their rights against businesses from whom they purchased products or
services.98 Preventing consumer deception or consumer fraud is one of
the foundations of consumer protection law. Since this is an interest that
has been upheld as legitimate by courts in the past, the nature of the state
interest the TCCWNA seeks to protect is legitimate and fulfills the first
factor established by Pike.99
B. The Burdens the TCCWNA Places upon Nation-wide Sellers is
Clearly Excessive in Relation to the Benefits New Jersey
Consumers Receive
After determining whether a statute serves a legitimate State interest,
the next step in the Pike balancing test is to see if the burden the statute
places on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation to putative
local benefits.100
i. Potential Inconsistent Regulation is a Burden that is Clearly
95

Id.
See, e.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 349 (“States
possess ‘broad powers’ to protect local purchasers from fraud and deception . . . .”); Clark v.
Citizens of Humanity, LLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1206 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (“[T]here is a
legitimate state interest in combating deceptive advertising . . . .”).
97
See Penn Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trane, U.S., Inc., No. 15-cv-2320, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 170731, at *3 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 2015) (“New Jersey has a strong interest in deterring
the manufacture and distribution of defective products from this State.”); see also Hunt, 432
U.S. at 349; Monster Bev. Corp. v. Herrera, EDCV 13-00786-VAP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
189315, at *18 (C.D. Cal Dec. 16, 2013) (“The state has an important interest in protecting
consumers from unfair and deceptive business practices.”)
98
Supra note 31.
99
Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
100
Id.
96
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Excessive
State laws have been invalidated under the dormant Commerce
Clause even when they appear to have been “genuinely
nondiscriminatory, in the sense that they did not impose disparate
treatment on similarly situated in-state and out-of-state interests, where
such laws undermined a compelling need for national uniformity in
regulation.”101 National uniformity in regulation is important because a
person or business might be subject to “haphazard, uncoordinated, and
even outright inconsistent regulation” by a State and therefore, an actor,
even those acting in good faith, might not realize it is violating a
statute.102
Courts determine whether an undermining of “national uniformity
in regulation” is taking place by evaluating the practical effect of the
statute. 103 Courts do this by considering the consequences of the statute
itself and how it may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of
other states.104 Courts consider what could occur if not one, but many, if
not all, states adopted similar legislation.105 Courts perform this task
because they want to protect against inconsistent legislation arising from
the protrusion of one state regulatory regime into another state’s
jurisdiction.106
On its face, the TCCWNA is a nondiscriminatory statute. Even
though only five out of the thirty TCCWNA class action lawsuits
addressing online retailer’s terms and conditions have been filed against
companies that are headquartered in New Jersey, the statute does not
target out-of-state sellers, nor benefit in-state sellers over them.107 All
101
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997). See also Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526-27 (1959) (conflict in state laws governing truck mud
flaps); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 763-64 (1945) (train
lengths). See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (“‘This
Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated statutes that may adversely
affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations’”); LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.2.3 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing Court’s review of
conflicting state laws under the dormant Commerce Clause).
102
Am. Libr. Assoc. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The District Court
prohibited the intentional use of the Internet “to initiate or engage” in certain pornographic
communications deemed to be
“harmful to minors.” Id.
103
Gen. Motors Corp., 519 U.S. at 297. See also CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88-89.
104
Id.
105
Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
106
Id.
107
See Sweeney v. Bed Bath & Beyond LLC, No. 2:16-cv-01927 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6,
2016); see also Martinez v. Burlington Stores Inc., No. 1:16-cv-02064 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 13,
2016); Roldan v. Toys R US, Inc., No. 2:16-cv-01929 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 6, 2016); Luca v.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., No. 2:16-cv-00746, (W.D. Pa. filed June 6, 2016); Guzman
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sellers are treated equally under the TCCWNA.108
Since the TCCWNA is facially non-discriminatory, the practical
effect, which includes an analysis of the consequences of the statute and
its potential interactions with other States’ statutes, must be evaluated
next. TCCWNA’s Section 16 requires that if a seller operates in other
jurisdictions besides New Jersey, its “contract or notice cannot simply
state in a general, nonparticularized fashion that some of the provisions
of the contract or notice may be void, inapplicable, or unenforceable in
some states.”109 Instead, the contract or notice must specifically state
what exact provisions are void, inapplicable, or unenforceable in New
Jersey.110
The consequence is that a website’s terms and conditions can no
longer be generalized. To comply with the TCCWNA, an online retailer
must adjust its terms and conditions to provide for the specific provisions
that are “void, inapplicable, or enforceable” every time it sells a product
to a New Jersey consumer.111
The TCCWNA’s potential interactions with other States’ statutes
could be quite costly and burdensome for online retailers engaging in
interstate commerce. An online retailer would have to make sure it is
complying with the TCCWNA’s requirements, while also undertaking a
separate analysis of every States’ laws to confirm that no statute similar

v. Devils Arena Ent., No. number 2:16-cv-01984 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 8, 2016). Contra Murphy
v. Wal-Mart.com USA, LLC, No. 2:16-CV-02629-ES-JAD (D.N.J. filed May 10, 2016)
(defendant headquartered in Arkansas); Patterson et. al v. Forever 21 Inc., No. number 3:16cv-05087-MAS-LHG (D.N.J. filed Nov. 8, 2016) (defendant headquartered in California);
Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 427, 70 A.3d 544, 549, (N.J. 2013) (defendant
headquartered in Illinois); Huhn v. Facebook Inc., No. 2:16-cv-03681 (D.N.J. filed June 22,
2016) (defendant headquartered in California); Braden v. TTI Floor North America Inc., No.
3:16-cv-00742 (D.N.J filed in Feb. 2016) (defendant headquartered in Ohio); Rubin v. Intuit
Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02029 (D.N.J. filed Apr. 12, 2016) (defendant headquartered in California);
Hite et al. v. Lush Cosmetics LLC, No. 1:16-cv-01533 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2016) (defendant
headquartered in Vancouver, Candada); Farrell et al. v. Sony Corp. of Am. et al., No. 2:16cv-04391 (D.N.J. filed July 20, 2016) (defendant headquartered in New York); Silkowski v.
Apple Inc., No 5:16-cv-02338 (N.D.Cal. filed Apr. 28, 2016) (defendant headquartered in
California); Russell v. Advance Auto Parts Inc., No. 3:16-cv-02685 (D.N.J. filed May 12,
2016) (defendant headquartered in Virginia); Braden, et al. v. Staples Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv03848 (D.N.J. filed July 1, 2016) (defendant headquartered in Massachusetts); Rubin v. Saks
Direct Inc., No. 3:16-CV-02197-PGS-LHG (D.N.J. filed Feb. 2016) (defendant
headquartered in New York);
108
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-18 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24) (nowhere in the TCCWNA does it target business’s outside of
the state of New Jersey).
109
Shelton, 214 N.J. at 427-28.
110
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-16 (Westlaw through L.2017, c. 317, 319-321, 323, 325,
328-330, 340 and J.R. No. 24).
111
See § 56:12-18.
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to the TCCWNA already exist.112 If similar statutes do exist, online
retailers could be faced with “multi-million dollar claims where no harm
has or may ever occur.113
After conducting a nation-wide analysis and potentially incurring
thousands of dollars in legal costs, an online retailer would then have to
adjust its terms and conditions to comply with each state. A company
could accomplish this goal two ways. The first is by purchasing
geographical identification software and then using that software to tailor
a website’s terms and conditions for that specific consumer’s location. 114
Geographical identification software is used to correctly ascertain the
locations of its online consumers. Unfortunately, this software is not only
costly, but it can also be evaded by consumers.115
One way geographical identification software can be evaded is
through cellphone applications. Consumers who purchase products on
their cellphones can install applications or “apps” such as “Fake GPS”
and “Location Mockup” to hide their current locations.116 These apps are
easy to use and inexpensive.117 To hide her location, a user only has to
turn off her phone’s GPS and location services, and then use the app to
manually specify what location she wants to pretend to be in.118 Once a
new location is set, geographical identification software will not be able

112

See Motion to Dismiss at 12:7-9, Silkowski v. Apple Inc., No 5:16-cv-02338 (N.D.Cal.
filed Apr. 28, 2016).
113
Id.
114
PUBLIC POLICY DIVISION, SOFTWARE & IND. INFO. ASS’N, GEOLOCATION TOOLS AND
GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET SEGMENTATION 2 (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/docume
nts/public_comments/2014/04/00010-89273.pdf (“Websites and online content providers
often use technical means to ascertain the geographical location of potential visitors. They
do this for a variety of socially beneficial purposes, including localizing content, fighting
online fraud and complying with local laws and regulations.”).
115
See, e.g., Janet Smith, Agilent Technologies’ New Geolocation Software Maps Emitter
Location Using RF Sensor Networks, AGILENT (May 1, 2009), http://www.agilent.com/about/
newsroom/presrel/2009/01may-em09081.html (“Pricing for a complete geolocation system,
including sensors and required software, starts at less than $150,000. The Agilent N6841A
RF Sensor is available now with deliveries in June. Pricing starts at $13,351.”); KEYSIGHT
TECH., KEYSIGHT N6854A GEOLOCATION SYSTEM - CONFIGURATION GUIDE 8 (2016) http://lite
rature.cdn.keysight.com/litweb/pdf/5991-2939EN.pdf (stating that Key Sight’s geolocation
software costs $1,500 for one year and $3,000 for two years).
116
See Darien Graham-Smith, How to: Surf the Web from a Fake Location, PC & TECH
AUTH. (Jul. 21, 2014, 12:47PM), http://www.pcauthority.com.au/Feature/390138,how-to-surf
-the-web-from-a-fake-location.aspx.
117
Id. After searching the iPhone’s “App Store” for location hiding apps, the most
expensive app was $5.00. However, most of the apps were either free, $0.99, or $2.99. On
Android, location hiding apps were all free. See https://play.google.com/store/apps/similar?id
=com.hide.me&hl=en (last visited May 10, 2018).
118
Id.
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to identify where a consumer is shopping from.119
Consumers using computers have a variety of options to hide their
whereabouts from geolocation software as well. Consumers can use a
proxy server to route internet traffic through an international channel,
usually encrypting a consumer’s data en route.120 A proxy server
provides a user with a virtual private network (VPN) service, which
allows subscribers to attain an Internet Protocol address or IP address
from any location a VPN service provides.121 Consumers can also use
Domain Name System or DNS segmentation, which allows a user to
change his location, or TOR, which is a network that allows anonymous
browsing, to hide his true location.122
The second way a company could comply with the requirements of
the TCCWNA and potential statutes like it is by making a single terms
and conditions that would encompass all the requirements in each of the
fifty states. This could create terms and conditions that are so lengthy
and convoluted, consumers would be less willing to read them and might
have trouble understanding which rights are guaranteed by their
individual states. This would run directly contrary to the original
intention of the TCCWNA, which was to prevent consumer deception
and raise awareness about consumer rights.123
Therefore, if other states adopted statutes similar to the TCCWNA,
it would be financially disastrous for online retailers. Online retailers
would be forced to incur significant legal costs and compliance fees to
combat a statute that does not require plaintiffs to demonstrate harm.
Unfortunately, even if these online retailers did put in a good faith effort
to comply, consumers could still skirt terms and conditions specifically
tailored to their states or be overwhelmed by a website’s terms and
conditions that encompasses all the legal nuances of each individual state.
This is why national uniformity is essential to prevent online retailers
from being exposed to “haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright
inconsistent regulation” that could potentially cost them millions of
dollars, but to also protect consumers by making sure they are fully aware
of their rights.124
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ii. The Nature of New Jersey’s Interest, Consumer’s Knowledge
of Their Existing Rights, Does Not Overcome the
Excessive Burden Placed Upon Sellers Engaging in
Interstate Commerce
Once a court determines that there is a legitimate state interest, an
acceptable degree of burden a state places on interstate commerce will
depend on the nature of the state’s interest.125 Under the TCCWNA’s
Section 16, the nature of New Jersey’s interest is knowledge. By enacting
the statute, New Jersey sought to protect its consumers and prospective
consumer’s knowledge of their existing rights. It hoped that by
preventing sellers from using clauses such as “void where prohibited”
more, New Jersey consumers would be aware of their rights and
ultimately enforce them if need be.126
However, the TCCWNA’s means do not arguably achieve its end.
Under the TCCWNA’s Section 16, if a seller is using a contract, notice,
or sign in multiple jurisdictions, it must specify which provisions
contained within are or are not enforceable in New Jersey. 127
Alternatively, if a consumer contract, notice, or sign is created only for
use in New Jersey and controlled by New Jersey law, the specification
requirement in Section 16 does not apply. 128 The specification
requirement makes a website’s terms and conditions, which are already
incredibly lengthy and convoluted, even more difficult to read and
understand for New Jersey current and prospective consumers.
Currently, because of the length and legalese contained within these
agreements, it takes an average internet user about forty minutes to read
the terms and conditions related to the different services that he or she
may use throughout a single day.129 That means a user could realistically
spend ten days a year reading websites’ terms and conditions.
However, this data assumes that users actually read a website’s
terms and conditions. Researchers in a 2016 study presented students
with a terms and conditions agreement to read and review, and out of the
543 students only twenty five percent even looked at them before
accepting.130 Additionally, on average, those students who did look at
125
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the agreement did so for only about one minute.131 Since terms and
conditions are usually thousands of words long and over ten pages, to
fully read an agreement would take much more than one minute.132 One
such illustration of this point is Apple’s iTunes terms and conditions. The
iTunes agreement currently contains 6,701 words and is sixteen pages
long.133 A recent study found that it took 193 minutes to read through
iTunes’ entire terms and conditions.134 Thus, reading the agreement for
one minute would only create for a consumer a minimal understanding of
his or her rights.
Since there is evidence that very few people look or read a website’s
terms and conditions, New Jersey’s interest in promoting consumer
awareness about legally established rights is not being adequately
achieved by the TCCWNA. Furthermore, putting New Jersey specific
provisions into a contract, notice, or advertisement with a multi-state
reach is most likely not raising consumer awareness. In fact, by including
these additional provisions in a website’s terms and conditions, it
increases the agreements length and makes it even more likely that a
consumer or prospective consumer would agree to the terms without
reading them. Therefore, since Section 16 of the TCCWNA is
counterintuitive to its own interest, the burden it creates upon interstate
commerce through potential inconsistent regulation should be deemed by
courts as clearly excessive under the Pike balancing test.135
C. New Jersey’s Interest in Raising Consumer Rights Awareness
Could Be Promoted in a Manner Less Impactful on Interstate
Commerce
Access to information and openness to procedures is important to
establish consumer autonomy, and New Jersey has a legitimate interest
to ensure that its consumers are aware of their rights. 136 However, there
131

Id. at 16.
See, e.g., Terms and Conditions, TARGET, http://www.target.com/c/terms-conditions//N-4sr7l (last visited May 10, 2018) (8,447 words and eighteen pages long); Terms of Use,
WALMART, http://help.walmart.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/8/~/walmart.com-terms-of-use
(last visited May 10, 2018) (6,503 words and sixteen pages long); Macy’s Terms and
Conditions of Purchase Orders, MACY’S, https://www.macysnet.com/mdocweb/documents.a
spx?id=1741 (last visited May 10, 2018) (9,419 words and twenty pages long).
133
See Apple Media Services Terms and Conditions, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal
/internet-services/itunes/us/terms.html (last visited May 10, 2018).
134
Rick Noack, How Long Would It Take To Read the Terms of Your Smartphone Apps?
These Norwegians Tried It Out, WASH. POST (May, 28, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.c
om/news/worldviews/wp/2016/05/28/how-long-would-it-take-to-read-the-terms-of-your-sm
artphone-apps-these-norwegians-tried-it-out/?utm_term=.cd12d2fd266a.
135
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
136
See supra Section III.B.2.
132

DERENZE

398

2018

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

are other means that are less impactful on interstate commerce to achieve
the same goal.
First, the TCCWNA could be amended to prohibit consumers or
prospective consumers from using it TCCWNA to bring class action
claims. This leaves sellers vulnerable to millions of dollars in civil
penalties and attorney’s fees that could be financially devastating and
potentially could raise the cost of services or products for smaller
companies.137 Therefore, if consumers were barred from bringing
TCCWNA class actions, sellers with a nationwide reach would not have
to incur high legal costs if a judgment was found against them for terms
and conditions that did not even contain a provision harming
consumers.138
Second, the TCCWNA could be amended to require ascertainable
loss to bring a claim. Currently, consumers are not experiencing an
economic consequence when a “void where prohibited” provision is
included in a website’s terms and conditions.139 This is evident in the
amount of TCCWNA claims that are currently being dismissed in federal
courts for failing to meet the heightened standing requirements
introduced by the United States Supreme Court in Spokeo v. Robinson.140
Under Spokeo, plaintiffs need to show “injury in fact” and the injury
needs to demonstrate “concrete and particularized harm.”141 Since
plaintiffs are not alleging any economic damages, their injury is not
concrete.142 Thus, New Jersey is not protecting consumers through the
TCCWNA because plaintiffs bringing claims under the statute are not
being harmed.143 Overall, amending the TCCWNA to include an
ascertainable loss requirement would further New Jersey’s goals of
protecting consumers from deceptive practices without burdening sellers
engaging in interstate commerce.
Finally, if New Jersey lawmakers are concerned about protecting
consumer’s knowledge of their existing rights, they could enact a statute
137
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that regulates the formation of terms and conditions in order to make them
more consumer friendly. Currently, terms and conditions are not being
read by consumers or prospective consumers because of their length and
convoluted language.144 If sellers were required to simplify their terms
and conditions, it may encourage more consumers to read and take
advantage of their rights, which aligns better with the New Jersey
legislature’s original intentions.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the TCCWNA was enacted in 1982, the New Jersey
legislature did not envision what effects the statute would have on ecommerce.145 Currently, plaintiffs, many times the same ones, are taking
advantage of unsuspecting out-of-state sellers who conduct business
online.146 Federal courts have attempted to intervene by dismissing
TCCWNA claims for not meeting Article III standing requirements under
Spokeo.147 However, the TCCWNA also violates the dormant Commerce
Clause because the statute discriminates against interstate commerce
through its practical effect.
A court can come to this conclusion by applying the balancing test
established in Pike v. Bruce Church.148 The test states: “Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be
upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits.”149 The degree of burden on
interstate commerce that will be tolerated depends on the nature of the
local interest involved and if there was a way for a state to achieve the
same goals with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.150
For the TCCWNA, the local public interest, consumer protection, is
legitimate.151 However, the nature of the interest, raising consumer
awareness about pre-existing rights, is defeated by the TCCWNA
itself.152 Section 16 of the TCCWNA requires a seller who operates in
multiple jurisdictions to clearly specify in its consumer contracts, notices,
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or advertisements which provisions may or may not be void.153 However,
studies show that consumers and prospective consumers either do not
look at a website’s terms and conditions or, if they do, only read them for
as little as one minute.154 Some terms and conditions, such as Apple’s
iTunes, require over three hours of reading.155 Therefore, requiring
sellers to specify provisions for New Jersey consumers only lengthens
these terms and conditions that consumers are already ignoring because
of their size and convoluted language.156 If there is no legitimate local
purpose, the statute will not be deemed constitutional.157
Additionally, sellers who engage in commerce in multiple
jurisdictions have the burden of navigating inconsistent regulation,
something the United States Supreme Court has not tolerated in the
past.158 Because of the TCCWNA’s burdens, sellers may need to incur
great legal costs in order to comply with similar laws across the United
States that may have different standards for their consumers’ terms and
conditions.159 Finally, New Jersey’s interests could be protected with a
lesser impact on interstate commerce if it did not allow class actions and
required ascertainable loss under the statute, or if it enacted a statute
requiring terms and conditions to be more consumer friendly in order to
promote awareness of pre-existing rights.160 For all of these reasons, the
TCCWNA fails the Pike balancing test and violates the dormant
Commerce Clause.161
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